U.S. Policy and the Safety of Kurdistan
Part Two: U.S. Policy after the Iraq War
Chaim Kaufmann
SOURCES OF THREAT
It is a truism
that the Kurds are the largest nation in the world that have no state. Everyone realizes that most Iraqi Kurds would
prefer sovereign independence to regional autonomy within Iraq and that many if not most Kurds in Turkey, Iran,
and Syria
would like formal regional autonomy or independence if they could get it. But almost all observers agree that none of
these things are possible. The quiet
American security guarantee to Iraqi Kurdistan would end if the Kurds declared
formal independence, while none of Turkish, Iranian, or Syrian Kurds can
achieve meaningful autonomy without substantial help from a strong foreign
power, which they will not get.
So the real
questions for the future security of Kurdistan are whether it will be possible
to establish the four-province autonomous region – including Kirkuk province –
provided for in the new Iraqi constitution, and whether that autonomous status
can be maintained, especially after most or all U.S. military forces have left
Iraq. This may or may not happen before
a new President takes office in 2009, but it will happen before long.
Kurdistan faces four main sources of threat. Three of them are the usual ones: the
governments of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. The fourth is possible change in U.S. policy
toward the region.
IRAQ
The Iraqi threat
is dormant for now because even though most ordinary Shia as well as Shia political
leaders dislike the idea of Kurdish autonomy, they are too concerned about
fighting the Sunni Arabs to devote much energy to the Kurdish issue. Back in Spring 2005 the dominant political
force in Iraq,
the Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), concluded that in order for the Shia
community to gain and keep control of the central government they had to have
Kurdish cooperation. This meant that
they had to pay the Kurds’ price – most important, the regional autonomy
provision that was written into the new constitution. They did it reluctantly, but they did
it. Since then, however, Shia opinion on
this issue has diverged further. While the
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and most of the rest of
the UIA have come to favor regional autonomy – for the South more than for the
North – or at least continue to tolerate the idea, Moqtada al-Sadr and his
followers are deeply opposed to it. When
parliament voted on October 11. 2006 to authorize the regional autonomy referenda
(albeit with an 18-month delay), the Sadrists joined Sunnis in boycotting the
vote. It remains possible that, before
the referendum on Northern autonomy is actually held, further changes in Shia
politics will lead them to block it.
Two factors will
matter most to Shia behavior toward Kurdistan—the
power of the central government and the behavior of Kurds. The central government is likely to remain
Shia-dominated but weak. Even if the
proposed “national unity government” including the key Sunni parties while
excluding the Sadrists is formed, the level of distrust between the Sunni and
Shia Arab communities will remain very high, and the civil war will likely
continue at least until ethnic cleansing has largely eliminated minorities of
either group in areas dominated by the other.
Recently Shia forces have begun trying to create an all-Shia band across
Northern Baghdad that would connect
majority-Shia neighborhoods and isolate certain majority-Sunni areas.
The result will
be a de facto partition in which the recognized
government of Iraq
will actually control only the Shia-dominated areas. While there may be substantial internal
conflict within the Shia community, the main policy concern of this ‘Shiastan’ will
be the continuing threat from the four mainly Sunni provinces
(‘Sunnistan’). There may be more rounds
of Sunni/Shia fighting even after ethnic cleansing is largely complete. Undermining Kurdish autonomy will not rank
high among Shia policy concerns, although there is a risk that—once the Shia
have secure control of the nine Southern provinces as well as most or all of
Baghdad—many of them will lose interest in a Southern autonomous region and
therefore feel free to withdraw their support for the Northern autonomous
region too.
Kurdistan can survive without the referendum, but its
chances in the medium and long term will be better with formal, internationally
recognized autonomy than without. This
means that Iraqi Kurds have strong incentives to make themselves useful to the
main Shia factions and to avoid annoying them unnecessarily. First, Kurds have thus far mostly stood aside
from the Sunni/Shia civil war, but might be better off seeking ways to assist
the Shia community’s efforts to secure itself.
The form of this assistance may not be important; it need not involve
committing troops. What matters is
creating an impression among Shia masses as well as leaders that they can count
on the Kurds as a source of help not only now but well into the future. If Iraqi Shia believe this, the referendum on
Northern autonomy will happen; if they don’t, it may not happen.
For the same
reasons, it has been sensible for Kurdish efforts to achieve an electoral
majority in Kirkuk
Province to rely mainly
on colonization rather than on ethnic cleansing. While this policy has not
avoided active resistance from Turcomans and Sunni Arabs, it avoids annoying
the Shia, the United States,
and Turkey
more than necessary. Efforts to contest
control of Mosul,
however, have been unwise. Regardless of what Kurds may think about historical
claims to the area, the fact is that in April 2003 Kurds were a small minority
in the city and in Ninewa
Province. Even more important, achieving Kurdish
control of Mosul
would require dividing the province—but the Iraqi constitution makes no provision
for this. Thus far the big war in the
South has reduced attention to the much smaller war over Mosul, but that won’t last forever. At some point the contest over Mosul will gain more attention and will annoy almost
everyone, both friends and enemies of Kurdistan.
IRAN
While Iran has
concerns about separatism among its Kurdish minority, the roughly 45 million
Farsi-speaking Shia who dominate the country have virtually no fear that a
Kurdish or any other separatist movement could actually succeed. Nor is there any realistic hope of deposing
the regime, however much American, European, Israeli, or Sunni Arab governments
detest it. Iranians, like everyone else,
are nationalists. While many of them are
dissatisfied with their government, the more that the U.S. or other outsiders threaten Iran, the more
the Iranian people rally around the regime.
Iran thus has no motive to act decisively
against Kurdistan – except one: Iraqi
Kurdish support for U.S.
efforts to promote a Kurdish separatist movement in Iran. Kurds are in a difficult position on this
issue, caught between current friends and possible future enemies. The key thing to keep in mind is that while
both Iran and the U.S. will remain permanent, powerful forces in
the region, relative power is shifting toward Iran.
TURKEY
Turkey, of course, remains the greatest threat
to the safety of Kurdistan. Turkey
has invaded Iraqi Kurdistan several times and has cooperated with offensives
launched from Baghdad. In April 2003 the Turkish military deployed its
three strongest armored divisions – nearly 60,000 men – on the Iraqi border and
offered to ‘take responsibility for security’ in Northern
Iraq. Although the U.S. told Turkey
to stay out, senior Turkish generals debated whether they should intervene anyway
and dare the U.S. – which
had only 2,000 lightly-armed airborne troops in Northern
Iraq – to shoot first. The Turkish
Commander in Chief, General Hilmi Ozkok, decided against the idea. Nevertheless, this incident illustrates how
extreme Turkish behavior can become over anything that they think could promote
Kurdish separatism in Turkey
even indirectly.
Since 2003,
Iraqi Kurds have permitted the PKK to begin re-constituting itself on
Kurdish-controlled territory. This can
only increase the risk that one day another Turkish general will make the
opposite decision.
U.S. POLICY
No one can mount
a serious attack against Kurdistan right now because the U.S. would not
permit it. But most Americans now
believe that the war in Iraq
was a mistake, most favor troop cuts, and nearly half favor starting troop
withdrawals immediately. Since there is
no prospect that minor adjustments in U.S. policy will end the Sunni/Shia civil
war or allow the building of an Iraqi government that is both effective and
friendly to the United States, pressure to get U.S. forces out of Iraq will
only increase.
Once the
decision to withdraw is made—whether by this President or by the next one—that
decision will force the United
States to confront several more
questions. One of these will be whether
to continue the client relationship with Iraqi Kurds, which could include
keeping a small permanent U.S.
garrison in Kurdistan. This, however, will not be seen by American
policy makers or by the public as the most important U.S. interest in the region. Others that will or may seem more important
will include:
-What to do
about Iran’s
nuclear weapons program. Many experts
believe that there is little that can be done, but that view does not control
policy, or not yet;
-What to do about
Iranian dominance of the region, including the likelihood that Iran will support Shia dissident movements in
the Sunni countries on the Southern side of the Persian
Gulf;
-What to do
about U.S.
relations with ‘Shiastan.’ Few Iraqi
Shia want to become clients of Iran,
but they will do what they have to if they cannot get enough of what they need
from the U.S; and
-What to do
about the U.S. relationship with Turkey, which has been damaged by U.S.—Turkish
disputes over the Iraq War as well as by European—Turkish bad feeling over the
continuing delay of Turkey’s application to join the EU. Islamist factions in Turkish politics are
growing stronger, and some of them are becoming more anti-Western. The U.S.
may have to decide what it will pay to salvage its relationship with Turkey before
it is too late.
It may seem that
U.S. concerns about the threat
from Iran can only push it
closer to any local power, such as Kurdistan,
that is willing to help. The problem is
that U.S. policy makers
could well decide that they need others more than they need Kurdistan. What will U.S.
leaders do if part of Turkey’s
price for help against Iran
includes the U.S.
abandoning the Kurds? Or, somewhat less
likely, if ‘Shiastan’ demands the same price for their cooperation? (The Saudis too might like to separate the U.S. from the Kurds—to strengthen the position
of Iraqi Sunni Arabs—but they are too afraid of Iran to insist.)
These are only
the most obvious dangers. When a region
as important as the Persian Gulf is suddenly
de-stabilized, no one can anticipate all the possibilities that may arise. The main point is that Kurds must realize
that they may not be able to count on the United States much longer and that
there is little that Kurds can do to influence the U.S. decision when (or if)
that moment comes. Kurds may think this
unfair, but should not be surprised. The
U.S. has abandoned the Kurds before when it decided that other interests were
more important, for instance in 1975 when the Shah and Saddam Hussein settled
their dispute over the Shatt al-Arab.
Iraqi Kurds must
begin thinking now about how to manage relationships with their neighbors
without U.S.
backing. Two steps that might help would
be to eject the PKK and to promise Iran
that support for Kurdish separatism in Iran
will end when U.S. forces
leave Iraq. Other issues will also require re-thinking.
Chaim Kaufmann
Associate
Professor
Lehigh University
Bethlehem,
Pennyslvania, U.S.A.